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This article illustrates how borders currently are being placed 
m~ithin the Internet through a combination of jurisdictional claims 
and technical developments. It makes clear that these borders are 
transforming the Internet from an open, and virtually global, 
communications network, into something that more resembles our 
physical world divi ed by borders of different kinds. 
It submits that, in light of the & an undesirable 
development, we must re-examine the possibility of treating the 
Internet as a separate space. Such a space must be approached in 
a context-specific anner. In other wor s, we must deal with each 
legal issue sepa f states ever are to  be 
inclined to give regulating the Internet, 
alternative form lace; relying on 
self-regulation is no an appropriate 
judiciary must be ive enforcement must be 
ensured. 
Focusing on Internet efamation, the article highlights bow a 
well-recognized regulato framework is already in place through 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political ts, and that 
an adjudicative body exists in the United Nation man Rights 
Committee. Drawing upon these existing mechanisms, a 
Convention el to regulate cross- er Internet defamation 
arising out of mass-communication is 
I. HNTRODUCTPBN 
plications, such as t 
recognized as being borderless. l This 
ess" causes complications in. relation to the applica- 
tion of law to Internet behavior. 
t is submitted that there are at least two ways in which the 
ietional difficulties associate with the Internet's unique set 
of characteristics can be addressed. er borders need to be 
placed on the Internet, or borders ne be placed around the 
Internet. 
The first alternative can be achieved in either of two ways: pri- 
vate international law can be a usted to  properly address 
Internet conflicts and place sensible protective borders on the 
nternet, or technical borders may be laced on the Internet, e.g., 
David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders -The Rise o f  Law in  
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1367 (1996); Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, Geo- 
location Technologies and Other Means of Placing Borders O n  the 'Borderless' 
Internet, 23 J .  MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. I;. 101, 101 (2004). 
through so-called geo-location techn~logies.~ Currently, borders 
seem to be placed on the Internet through a combination of these 
two approaches. 
The second alternative-placing borders around the Internet- 
partly echoes the message of pioneer cyber-libertarialas, such as 
that expressed by John Perry Barlow in his famous Declaration of 
the Independence of Cyberspace .3 Such ideas were popular 
amongst early commentators, but have essentially been aban- 
doned as unrealistic. 
However, this article argues that, in light of the extraordinarily 
serious consequences of placing borders on the Internet, it is nec- 
essary to  re-examine the possibility of placing borders around it. 
or that to be a feasible path to take, however, we must 
from the utopian dreams of "self regulation" relied upon by early 
commentators.* This article argues that, at least in relation to 
e areas of law, placing borders around the In te r~e t  is a realis- 
tic alternative provided that a structure of separate regulation 
with separate dispute resolution functions is put in place. This 
proposition is discussed in the context of one of the most contro- 
versial areas of law-Internet defamati~n.~ 
HE. THE DIFFICULTIES ASSOCIATED WITH INTERNET 
The regulation of defamation is essentially an exercise in bal- 
ancing two fundamental human rights: the freedom of expression 
on the one hand, and the right of reputation on the other? As 
such, it is not surprising states generally are very 
of their right to decide matisn disputes. Serious 
arise when material is lawful from where it is made available, but 
Svantesson, supra note 1, at 101-03, 137; Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, Private 
International Law and the Internet (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of New 
South Wales (2004)) (on file with author). 
"ee John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, 
Feb. 8, 1996, http://homes.eff.org/-barlow~eclaration-Finalhtml (purporting 
that the law of the physical world does not apply to the dimensions of 
cyberspace). 
Johnson & Post, supra note 1, at 1367, 1387; Barlow, supra note 3. 
See infra Part II; Johnson & Post, supra note 1, at 1367, 1381 (noting that 
treatment of the global Internet as a separate place creates confusing standards 
with regards to liability because allegedly defamatory statements would only be 
considered as published "on the Net" and not distributed on paper). 
DAVID LINDSAY, CTR. FOR MEDIA COMM. & INFO. TECH. LAW, RESEARCH PAPER 
No. 10, LIABILIW FOR THE PUBLICATION OF DEFAMATORY MATERIAL VIA THE 
INTERNET 4 (20001, available a t  http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/crncl/ 
publicationsDefamation.pdf. 
unlawful in some other state, and that latter state is asked to 
exercise jurisdiction over the person responsible for the material 
being made available. Several Internet applications, including 
VWVW, BBS and e-mail, are ideally suited for distributing mate- 
rial to foreign places in an easy and cost-effective manner. 
There has been a range of high-profile disputes relating t o  juris- 
dictional issues in Internet defamation cases. In the United 
States, jurisdiction has been exercised on a range of grounds in 
earlier Internet defamation cases? It would now, however, seem 
that the "effects test" has prevailed online also. The leading case 
on this topic is arguably Young v. New Haven A d ~ o c a t e . ~  There, 
two newspapers based outside Virginia published articles, in part 
discussing the conduct of Virginian residents in Virginia.g The 
articles were available both offline and online.'O Despite this, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded 
that: 
The newspapers did not post materials on the Internet with the 
manifest intent of targeting Virginia readers. Accordingly, the news- 
papers could not have "reasonably anticipate[d] being baled into 
court [in Virginia] to  answer for the truth of the statements made in 
their article[s]." . . . In sum, the newspapers do not have sufficient 
Internet contacts with Virginia to permit the district court to exer- 
cise specific jurisdiction over them." 
Throughout its published decision, the Court made frequent ref- 
erence to ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Service Consultants, Inc.,12 a 
copyright case decided a couple of months earlier.13 In ALS 
See, e.g., Krantz v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 427 S.E.2d 326, 328-29 (Va. 1993); 
Bochan v. La Fountaine, 68 F. Supp. 2d 692,698-99 (E.D. Va. 1999) (holding that 
jurisdiction was based on the location of the internet server). 
See generally Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002) 
(reversing the lower court's decision denying defendant's motion to dismiss for 
lack of jurisdiction because the newspapers failed to show sufficient contacts 
with Virginia by merely posting on the Internet). 
Id. a t  259. Maximum-security prisons in Connecticut were overcrowded, and 
as a consequence, Connecticut had contracted with Virginia to house a number of 
Connecticut prisoners. The articles in question discussed the state of a penal 
institution in Virginia, as well as the conduct of its warden. Id. 
Id. a t  260. 
l1 Id.  a t  264 (quoting Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984) (emphasis 
added)). The targeting approach has also been strongly advocated in recent 
literature. See, e.g., Gregory J. Wrenn, Cyberspace is Real, National Borders are 
Fiction: The Protection of Expressive Rights Online Through Recognition of 
National Borders in Cyberspace, 38 STAN. J. INT'L L. 97, 98 (2002). 
l2 293 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 2002). 
l3 Young, 315 F.3d at  261-63. 
Scan, l4 the Court formulated the following test, based on the so- 
called "Zippo test"15 developed in 1997: 
[Wle conclude that a State may, consistent with due process, exer- 
cise judicial power over a person outside of the State when that per- 
son (1) directs electronic activity into the State, (2) with the 
manifested intent of engaging in business or other interactions 
within the State, and (3) that activity creates, in a person within the 
State, a potential cause of action cognizable in the State's courts. 
Under this standard, a person who simply places information on the 
Internet does not subject himself to  jurisdiction in each State into 
which the electronic signal is transmitted and received. Such pas- 
sive Internet activity does not generally include directing electronic 
activity into the State with the manifested intent of engaging busi- 
ness or other interactions in the State thus creating in a person 
within the State a potential cause of action cognizable in courts 
located in the State. l6 
By considering part one and part two of the test'together, the 
Court in Young modified the M S  Scan test to  work "more 
smoothly"17 for cases where the Internet activity is the posting of 
news articles on a website: "We thus ask whether the newspapers 
manifested an intent to  direct their website content-which 
included certain articles discussing conditions in a Virginia 
prison-to a Virginia audience."18 
On September 16, 2005, the Ontario Court of Appeal (Canada) 
decided that former United Nations official Cheickh Bangoura 
would not be allowed to  sue the Washington Post in Ontario over 
two articles that accused Mr. Bangoura of sexual harassment, and 
financial wrongdoings while he was working in the Ivory Coast.19 
When the disputed articles were published in 1997, there were 
only seven subscribers to the Washington Post in Ontario.20 How- 
ever, the articles could also be accessed on the newspaper's 
~ e b s i t e . ~ ~  
l4 293 F.3d 707. 
l5 Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 
1997) (developing a "sliding scale" of personal jurisdiction analysis, stating that 
'"he likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is 
directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity that an 
entity conducts over the Internet"). 
l6 U S  Scan, 293 F.3d at 714. 
l7 Young, 315 F.3d at 263. 
l8 Id. 
l9 Bangoura v. Washington Post, No. C41379, 142 A.C.W.S. (3d) 247 (0.C.A. 
Sept. 16, 2005), available at 2005 A.C.W.S.J. LEXIS 6141, "1, "3-4, 93-24. 
20 Id.  at *1-2. 
21 Id. at "5-6. 
r. Bangoura, who moved to Ontario approximately three years 
after the articles first were published, initiated the action against 
the Washington Post in an Ontario court in 2003, six years after 
the articles were published.22 Motivated by the view that the 
Washington Post '6should have reasonably foreseen that the story 
would follow the plaintiff wherever he resided,"23 the 
Superior Court of Justice ruled in favor of Mr. Bangoura in Janu- 
ary 2004.24 However, the Superior Court of Justice's decision in 
this matter changed the direction in which Canadian law is head- 
ing within this controversial area of law. T noted "that 
there is simply no real and substantial con etween this 
action and O n t a r i ~ . " ~ ~  
The Internet defamation dispute between Victorian (Australia) 
usinessman, Joseph Gutnick, and U.S. publishing company, Dow 
Company Inc., has gained a large amount of attention.26 
Dow Jones published an article allegedly defamatory of 
G ~ t n i c k . ~ ~  The article was available both in a magazine 
online, and was mainly read in the U.S.28 However, a small num- 
ber of copies of the magazine were distributed in Victoria, and the 
website containing the article had a small number of subscribers 
in Vi~toria.~' An exact number of readers could not be established 
dbr either the web or the magazine version of the article, but it was 
suggested that important Victorian business people had in fact 
read the article. Mr. Gutnick sued Dow Jones in the Supreme 
Court of Victoria seeking damages for defamation. Dow Jones 
responded by claiming that the court lacked jurisdiction over the 
dispute; however, in case the court should find it has jurisdiction, 
it should decline to exercise its jurisdiction. Finally, if the court 
was to decide the dispute, U.S. law should be applied.30 
The Gutniek case is interesting for several reasons, and is 
elieved to be the first of its kind. As far as jurisdiction is con- 
cerned, it is to be noted that the majority of the High Court of 
22 Id. a t  *1-2, "4. 
23 Bangoura v. Washington Post, [2004] 235 D.L.R (4th) 564, 571. 
24 Id. a t  576. 
25 Bangoura, 2005 A.C.W.S.J. LEXS 6141, a t  "622. 
26 See generally Dow Jones & Go. v. Gutnick, (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575. 
27 Id. a t  594. 
28 Id.  a t  622. 
29 Id.  a t  607. 
30 Id. a t  595-96, 607. This is a common approach for a defendant wishing to 
avoid having a dispute heard in the forum in question. Note, however, that the 
option of asking the court to decline jurisdiction is mainly available in common 
law courts. 
Australia found that Victoria may exercise jurisdiction over Dow 
ones as the tort sued for was committed in Victoria3' and da 
ages were suffered in Victoria. The basis for the court's conchs 
can arguably be said t o  be found in the following passage: 
However broad may be the reach of any particular means of commu- 
nication, those who make information accessible by a particular 
method do so knowing of the reach that their information may have. 
In particular, those who post information on the World Wide Web do 
so knowing that the information they make available is available to 
all and sundry without any geographic res t r ' lc t i~n.~~ 
Another Australian Internet defamation case sf interest 
involved a dispute between, on the one hand, the Macquarie Ban 
Limited and one employee, and on the other hand, a former 
employee of the bank.33 In that case, the plaintiffs were seeking 
an injunction against publications occurring via a website alleged 
to be linked to the defendant.34 The Court however; did not 
the injunction: 
An injunction to restrain defamation in NSW is designed to ensure 
compliance with the laws of NSW, and to protect the rights of plain- 
tiffs, as those rights are defined by the law of NSW. Such an injunc- 
tion is not designed to superimpose the law of NSW relating to 
defamation on every other state, territory and country of the world. 
Yet that would be the effect of an order restraining publication on 
the Internet. It is not to be assumed that the law of defamation in 
other countries is coextensive with that of NSW, and indeed, one 
knows that it is not. It may very well be that, according to  the law of 
the Bahamas, Tazhakistan [sic], or  Mongolia, the defendant has an 
unfettered right to publish the material. To make an order interfer- 
ing with such a right would exceed the proper limits of the use of the 
injunctive power of this court. For this reason alone, I would refuse 
the order 
Finally, in dnvestasia v. Kodansha, a businessman and his busi- 
ness (neither f them based in Hong Kong, but both doing busi- 
ness in Hong nag and elsewhere) initiated a defamation action in 
31 See Vict. Stat. R. Regs. & B., 5 7.01(1)(i), 1996 (Austl.). 
32 DOW Jones & Co. v. Gutnick, (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575. 
33 Macquarie Bank Etd. v. Berg, (1999) N.S.W.S. Ct. 526 a t  ql 1 ,3,  available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au (enter search query for [1999] NSWSC 526, and select 
case from list). 
34 Id. a t  ql 1, 4, 5. 
35 Id. a t  ql 14-15. 
a Hong Kong court against two defendants based in Japan.36 
According to the statement of claim, the plaintiffs were libelled by 
two articles, written in Japanese, by one defendant and published 
by the other.37 The articles appeared in a magazine as well as on 
a w e b ~ i t e . ~ ~  While approximately 500,000 copies of the magazine 
were published, only 157 copies were distributed in Hong K ~ n g . ~ ~  
Further, it was not known how many people read the online ver- 
~ i o n . ~ '  In relation to the comparatively small number of copies 
that had been distributed in Hong Kong, Justice Findlay 
remarked that: 
Of course, one can do sums with the figures and say that the number 
published in Hong Kong compared with the total number is very 
small, but I do not think this is the right approach. What I am con- 
cerned about is whether or not the number is significant for the pur- 
poses of deciding whether a complaint about the publication could be 
said to be one of substance. I think it is. 
This consideration must take into account the nature of the publica- 
tion. If it is low-key and boring, one might think that a greater size 
of publication is necessary to consider the tort  committed as sub- 
stantial for present purposes. Where, however, as here, the alleged 
defamatory material is what one may describe as sensational and 
juicy, a much smaller size of publication would be sufficient. The 
nature of the material published in the case before me is such that, 
in the nature of things, one would expect what is said about the 
plaintiffs to spread from mouth to ear quickly amongst those who 
might do business with them. In these circumstances, I would 
regard a significantly smaller number than 157 as sufficient.41 
In deciding the matter, Justice Findlay made an interesting 
observation also in relation to whether the plaintiff had a suffi- 
cient connection to, and reputation in, Hong Kong. While Lord 
36 Investasia Ltd. v. Kodansha Co. [I9991 H.K.C.F.I. 499 (H.C.), available at  
http:/Aegalref.judiciary.gov.hMrs/commodjdjudgment.jsp (search case number 
HCA01251911997 and select case link). 
37 Id. 
38 Id .  
39 Id .  
40 Id .  
41 Id. It is interesting to note that this way of thinking (i.e. "one can do sums 
with the figures and say that the number published in Hong Kong compared with 
the total number is very small, but I do not think this is the right approach") 
appears to be contrary to the English tradition. Id. See, e.g., Tara Garfinkel, 
Jurisdiction Over Communication Torts: Can You be Pulled into Another 
Country's Court System for Making a Defamatory Statement Over the Internet? A 
Comparison of English and U.S. Law, 9 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 489, 523 (1996) 
(stating that "[tlhe court will consider a defendant publication's relative 
circulation in England as compared to elsewhere"). 
INTERNET 351 
Justice Hirst used the conjunctive, "and," between "connection" 
and "reputation" in the famous English case Berezovsky v. Forbes 
h e . ,  Justice Findlay argued "that the fundamental consideration 
is the extent to which the plaintiffs have a reputation in Hong 
Kong to  protect. The degree to which the plaintiffs have connec- 
tions here is evidence that they have, or have not, a reputation 
here that merits pr~tect ion."~~ Furthermore, having noted the 
well-established common law principle that "[p]~blication*~ of the 
libels in Hong Kong would be torts committed in Hong K ~ n g , " ~ ~  
Justice Findlay made the odd remark that "damage in Hong Kong 
in a libel case can flow only from a publication in Hong Kong. So, 
whether they say so or not, the plaintiffs are confined in their 
action to  a tort committed in Hong Kong causing damage in Hong 
K ~ n g . " ~ ~  
The above highlights the difficult issues involved in cross-bor- 
der Internet defamation cases, and makes clear that different 
courts take different approaches to these matters. It also brings 
attention to  the fact that defamation law is a rather intensively 
litigated area of law, as far as Internet jurisdictional issues are 
concerned. 
The above examination also reveals that individual states do 
make jurisdictional claims over foreign publishers, and do seek to 
apply their laws to them. A consequence of this is that virtual bor- 
ders are being placed on the Internet-website operators are 
forced to take measures to  avoid contact with those jurisdictions 
they do not wish to be legally exposed to.46 In other words, if a 
United States publisher wishes to avoid the risk of being sued in 
Australia under Australia's defamation laws, it must take steps to 
42 Compare Berezovsky v. Forbes Inc., (1999) E.M.L.R. 278, 300 (stating that 
"the extent to which the plaintiff has connections with and a reputation to 
protect in this country" as the standard in England), with Investasia, [I9991 
H.K.C.F.I. 499 (considering primarily "the extent to which the plaintiff[ 1 [has] a 
reputation . . .to protect"). 
43 Note that under the common law, "publication" occurs where the 
defamatory meaning enters the mind of a third person. See, eg., Webb v. Bloch 
(1928) 41 C.L.R. 331,363 (Austl.) ( "To publish a libel is to convey by some means 
to the mind of another the defamatory sense embodied in the vehicle."). 
44 Investasia, [I9991 H.K.C.F.I. 499; see also Yung v. Brion, [20021 H.K.C.F.I. 
652, •÷ 13 (C.F.I.), available at  http://legalref.judiciary.gov.hMlrs/~ 
judgment.jsp (search case number HCA000079/2002 and select case link) 
(making reference to Bata v. Bata, [I9481 WN 366 (C.A.)). 
45 Investasia, [I9991 H.K.C.F.I. 499. 
46 See id. (supporting the proposition that if defendants did not want to be 
legally exposed to Hong Kong, then they should have taken measures t o  avoid 
contact with Hong Kong). 
prevent its websites from being accessed in Australia. Alterna- 
tively, such a publisher could attempt to ensure that all of its coa- 
tent is legal everywhere. This latter approach has two serious 
problems associated with it: first, it is unrealistic for a website 
operator to know all the laws of all the states of the world. Sec- 
ond, to avoid having to know all the laws of all the states of the 
world, website operators would need to adjust their content to  the 
most restrictive laws they are exposed to. This would dearly lea 
to a race to the bottom and valuable online content would be lost. 
At the same time, the placing of borders an the Internet seems 
to  be a more realistic goal than placing borders around the 
Internet. This is due to  several factors, but in particular it is due 
to the fact that states would be unwilling to  give up their jurisdic- 
tional claims over the Internet, and Internet activity. 
The most obvious manner in which borders are being place 
the Internet is through the application of private internati 
law rules; states make jurisdictional claims reaching outside their 
territory and thereby stake their claims over Internet a c t i ~ i t i e s . ~ ~  
Arguably, the most prominent article discussing the role played by 
private international law in Hnternet regulation is Goldsmith's 
Against C y b e r a n a ~ h y . ~ ~  Taking his point of departure in the 
writings of the people he refers to  as "regulation skeptics," Gold- 
smith draws essentially two eonclusions: "From the perspective of 
jurisdiction and choice of law, regulation of c erspdtce transac- 
tions is no less feasible than regulation of r transnational 
t ransac t i~ns" ;~~ and extraterritorial claims of jurisdiction, an 
application of law, are legally legitimate when local harm 
been caused.50 
calliy, Goldsmith is correct in dismissing the notion that all 
Internet activities are, or should be, immune from territorial regu- 
lations: "Cyberspace participants are no more self-contained than 
telephone users, members of the Catholic Church, corp~rati~ns,  
and other private groups with activities that transcend jurisdic- 
47 Samuel F. Miller, Note, Prescriptive Jurisdiction over Internet Activity: The 
Need to Define and Establish the Boundaries of Cyberliberty, 10 IND.  J. GLOBAL 
LEGAL STUD. 227, 229, 254 (2003). 
48 Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 UNW. CHI.  L. REV. 1199 
(1998). 
49 Id. a t  1199, 1213. 
50 E.g., id. a t  1240 (explaining that a jurisdiction can regulate extraterritorial 
acts under the concept of territorial sovereignty). 
tional borders."51 From the perspective of jurisdiction and choice 
of law, the conclusion that regulation of cyberspace transactions is 
feasible should not stem from any comparison between Internet 
communications and offline communications. Instead, it is 
respectfully submitted, that the real motivation for the feasibility 
of private international law rules being applied to  the Internet is 
that we create the rules of private international law, so we can 
make them work in any context. The rules of private interna- 
tional law have developed, been modified and change 
ously since rules of private international law were first created - 
there is no reason to think that we will not be able to  apply private 
international law rules to Internet activities. 
A. Internet Architecture and "Borders" 
There has been considerable technical developrqent towards 
placing geographical borders on the Internet.52 These technologi- 
cal advancements are partly motivated by perceived business 
advantages. For example, if a website operator can see where an 
access-seeker is located, "suitable" advertisement can be specifi- 
cally targeted at that i n d i ~ i d u a l . ~ ~  Other perceived advantages 
include ensuring regulatory compliance, reduced fraud risk and 
the keeping of licensed content within b ~ u n d a r i e s . ~ ~  At the same 
time, it cannot be ignored that these technological advancements 
also are partly motivated by website operators? desire to avoid con- 
tact with "web-surfers" from undesirable states.55 
The fact that the Internet is being regulated through both the 
law and technical develo ments is widely ackno~ledged .~~ 
51 Id. at 1242. 
52 See Svantesson, supra note 1, at 137-38 (explaining the development of the 
Internet from a borderless dimension to a place that takes into account legal and 
geographical borders). 
53 Id. at 102. 
54 See id. at 102-03 (emphasizing the advantage of being able to alter web site 
material to comply with the regulations of an access-seeker's geographical 
location). 
55 See id. at 114-17 (discussing the advantages to web site operators when 
accurate geographic location technology is employed). 
56 However, so far, little attention has been given to this issue in relation to 
the placing of borders on the Internet. See, e.g., Matthew Fagin, Comment, 
Regulating Speech Across Borders: Technology us. Values, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & 
TECH. L. REV. 395, 398-99 (2003) (noting the new, emerging trend of imposing 
geographic borders on cyberspace, as evolved through case law and new 
technology). 
e better-known articles dealing with the relation between law 
and technology is Joel Reidenberg's Lex I n f ~ r r n a t i c a ~ ~ :  
This Article will show that for network environments and the Infor- 
mation Society, . . . law and government regulation are not the only 
source of rulemaking. Technological capabilities and system design 
choices impose rules on participants. The creation and implementa- 
tion of information policy are embedded in network design and stan- 
dards as well as in system config~rat ions.~~ 
though it is undeniably true that the technological structure 
f the Internet does impose rules on Internet activities, this is 
sdly a new p h e n ~ m e n o n . ~ ~  In a sense, this is not different from 
ay the physical structures of the road network imposes rules 
on activities on our roads. Just as the introduction of PICSGO will 
affect Internet users' beha~ior,"~ the expansion of a certain road 
, for example, four to  six lanes, will affect the behavior of the 
users of that road. Similarly, just as regulators of the Internet 
need to take account of technological solutions, regulators of the 
road network need to consider technological solutions (e.g., speed 
cameras, widening of roads, traffic lights e t ~ . ) . ~ ~  The important 
difference is that the road network is essentially under govern- 
ment control and the Internet's architecture and development is 
largely in the hands of private companies. Lawrence Lessig has 
explored this vital d i f f e ren~e .~~  In referring to architecture as 
5a Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Inforrnatica: The Formulation of Information Policy 
Rules Through Technology, 76 TEXAS L. REV. 553 (1998). 
58 Id. at 554-55. 
59 Lawrenbe Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 
P3[ARv. L. REV. 501, 507-09 (1999). 
60 See Reidenberg, supra note 57, at  558-59 ("PICS [Platform for Internet 
Content Selection] is a set of technical specifications that define a standard 
format for rating labels describing materials available on the Internet and a 
standard mechanism for distributing those labels."). 
See id. at 558-60 (explaining that the structure of PICS could permit 
filtering by individual choice but still provide automatic enforcement). 
62 See Graham Greenleaf, An Endnote on Regulating Cyberspace: Architecture 
us. Law?, 21 U. N.S.W. L. J., 593, 604, stating: 
In real space laws criminalising bank robbery are very helpful, but thick 
walls, bulletproof glass, armed guards and combination locks on safes are 
the most effective constraints. We don't need a law on larceny of real 
property. When considering the combination of constraints which make up 
regulation in real space, it is easy to ignore the roles of the natural 
environment, the artefacts of the built environment, and human biology, 
because we so often take them as the 'givens' of the situation being 
regulated. 
63 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999) 
(giving a detailed discussion of the architecture and development of the internet). 
"code", Lessig states that "[olnce it is plain that code can replace 
law, the pedigree of the codewriters becomes central. Code in 
essence becomes an alternative sovereign-since it is in essence 
an alternative structure of regulation. But who authors this sover- 
eign authority? And with what legitima~y?"~~ 
B. Geo-Location Technologie~~~ 
In bringing popular attention to, and increased understanding 
of, the fact that the Internet is being regulated both through law 
and technical developments, Lawrence Lessig made several inter- 
esting statements: 
I said that we could understand regulation in real space as a func- 
tion of four sorts of constraints-law, norms, markets, and what I, 
called real space code. We can understand regulation in cyberspace 
in the same way. Regulation in cyberspace is a function of similar 
constraints. It too is a function of the  constraints of law; of norms, of 
the market, and of what  I will call, "code."66 
While Lessig outlines four mechanisms for regulation, only the 
relation between legal. code and computer code is relevant here. 
The fact that lawmakers take account of technological develop- 
ments is of central importance when examining the potential uses 
of so-called geo-location technologies. 
The use of technology to  pinpoint the geographical location ~f 
those active on the Internet is a fairly new phenomenon and has 
not yet gained any large amount of attention in literature. In 
"older" Internet c~rnmentar ies~~ and case law68 pinpointing the 
geographical location of a user was frequently said to  be impossi- 
ble. Indeed, the impossibility of linking those active on the 
Internet to a geographical location has been said to  be a distinc- 
64 Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach 25 
(1997) (unpublished working draft, on file with Albany Law Journal of Science 
and Technology) bereinafter Lessig's Law of the Horse Working Draft] (as 
referred to in: Greenleaf, supra note 62, at  601 n.29). 
I have previously dealt with these technologies in detail. See Svantesson, 
supra note 1, at  101-39. This part of the article draws upon that publication. 
66 Lessig's Law of the Horse Working Draft, supra note 64, at  17; see also 
Lawrence Lessig, supra note 59, at 506-508 for the revised published version. 
67 See Johnson & Post, supra note 1, at 1374 (exploring the increasing 
involvement of the legal system within the expanding boundaries of Cyberspace); 
see also more recent works, such as: HENRIK SPANG-HANSSEN, ORWEGIAN 
RESEARCH CENTER FOR COMPUTERS r n ~  LAW, CYBERSPACE JURISDICTION IN TKE 
U.S. - THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF DUE PROCESS 3 (2001) (investigating 
the structure of the world wide web and its expansion since its birth). 
68 See, e.g., Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 170-71 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997). 
tive feature of the If ever true, the development of the 
ntelrnet has now rendered these statements obsolete, at  least in 
an Jerker B. Svantesson wrote: 
[Ilt is still true that Internet communication largely lacks reliable 
geographical identifiers . . . geo-location technologies are becoming 
increasingly accurate, and while [they are] unlikely to ever be one 
hundred percent accurate, may, [as will be discussed below] in the 
near future or perhaps already today, be accurate enough for legal 
purposes.70 
As outlined elsewhere, geo-location technologies operate on sev- 
eral levels.71 We will here focus on geo-location technologies that 
are based on the translation of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses 
into geographical locations, by the use of information stored by the 
er of the geo-location service. URLs work as follows: 
As the access-seeker enters the appropriate Uniform Resource Loca- 
tor ("URE") into hisher browser, or clicks on the appropriate hyper- 
link, an access-request is sent to the server operating the requested 
Web site. As the server receives the access-request, it, in turn, sends 
a location request (e.g. forwards the access-seeker's Internet Proto- 
col ("IP)') address) to  the provider of the geo-location service. The 
provider of the geo-location service has gathered information about 
the I$ addresses in use, and built up a database of geo-location infsr- 
ased on the information in this database, the provider of 
the geo-location service gives the Web site server an educated guess 
as to the access-seeker's location. Armed with this information, the 
Web server can provide the access-seeker with the information 
deemed suitable [or if desirable, deny access to the requested 
content] .72 
econnecting back to the interaction between law and architec- 
ture (here exemplified by geo-location technologies), it is interest- 
ing to  note how the French Court's 2000 decision in the Yahoo! 
ncluded, based on the expert evidence provided, that the 
nt, Yahoo! Inc., successfully could prevent access-seekers, 
located in France from accessing the disputed Nazi memorabilia/ 
69 See id. at 164, 166 (commenting on the Internet's lack of a centralized, 
geographic location). 
70 Svantesson, supra note 1, at  101-102. 
71 See id. (distinguishing between sophisticated geo-location technologies and 
geo-location technologies). 
72 Id. at 110. 
junk available on its ~ e b s i t e . ~ ~  In that case, the existence of feasi- 
ble technical solutions was determinative. 
C. The Problems with Borders Being Placed on the Internet 
The placing of borders on the Internet has the obvious conse- 
quence of people using the Internet having to cross these borders. 
It is in relation to this observation that the difference between 
borders imposed by private international law, and bor 
imposed by technology, becomes clear. 
If a person located outside the US, for example, seeks to access 
the website of Showtime Online (by entering the URL "www.sho. 
corn"), they will be met with the following message: "Sorry. 
Showtime Online express our apologies; however, these pages are 
intended for access only from within the United States."74 In this 
case, the average Internet user is si 1y unable to access the rele- 
vant website-a relatively firm ge aphically focused border is 
placed around the website in question. If, or perhaps more likely 
when, this practice becomes widesprea then the ""brdesrless9' 
Internet will cease to exist. 
While the borders imposed by private international law may 
make people reluctant to engage in cross-border interactions, they 
do not directly prevent such activities. In contrast, the borders 
imposed by technology may actually prevent the crossing of those 
borders. At the same time, however, it must be remembered that 
the borders raised by technology may be motivated by the need for 
borders created by claims under private international law. Thus, 
in a sense, private international law oes not only directly erect 
borders through extraterritorial juris tional claims, it also indi- 
rectly erects borders through its i ence on people's use of 
technology. 
While the technologies that make these kinds of borders possi- 
ble can be cir~umvended,~~ we are doubtlessly witnessing the 
73 Int'l League Against Racism & hti-Semitism (LICRA) v, Yahoo! Inc., 
Superior Court of Paris, Nov. 20, 2000 (Fr.) translated by GigaLaw.com, http:// 
www.gigalaw.com/library/france-yahoo-2000- 11-20-lapres.htm1. 
74 See The L Word, Guinevere Turner.com, http://www.sociopranos.codGTS/ 
thelword.htm1 (last visited Mar. 19, 2006) (blogging about Showtime Online's 
message to non-US residents); see also Reason: Hit & Run, A Steaming Pile of 
Entertainment (Dec. 22, 2003), http://www.reason.com/hitandrun/2003/12/aa 
steaming-pileshtml (blogging about Shswtime Online's message to non-US 
residents). 
75 See Svantesson, supra note 1, at 101-02 (explaining that even though 
technology that identifies geographical Internet borders is getting more accurate, 
it will probably never be one hundred percent reliable). 
Internet un ergoing a remarkable change-from the world's first 
and only "borderless" communications medium to something that 
les our physical world divided by borders of dif- 
it may no longer, if it ever was, be valid to 
nnot make jurisdictional claims in relation to 
what occurs on the Internet. However, it is still important to  
uestion whether such claims are desirable, and having recog- 
roblems that arise from such juris ictional claims, it is 
rtant to search for better alter 
y attempt to turn the Internet into a totally separate legal 
space would be highly complex. In fact, such a development may 
n the foreseeable future. At the same time, it 
ed that in at least one area, the Internet is 
as a separate space with separate, or, more 
accurately, co-existing regulation, and to an extent separate dis- 
pute resolution functions-domain names. The Internet Corpora- 
tion for Assi Numbers (IGANN) is a quasi- 
governmental organization in control of the IP address space allo- 
cation, protocol arameter assignment, domain name system 
root server system management functions. 76 
ctual Property Organisation (WIPO) is an inter- 
national organization dedicated to  helping to ensure that the 
rights of creators an owners of intellectual property are protected 
worldwide an hat inventors and authors are recognized and 
ir ingenuity,77 and it provides a dispute resolu- 
main name disputes.78 While playing different 
parts, when combined, these two bodies provide for regulation of, 
and adjudication of disputes relating to, domain names.79 How- 
ever, it is to be remembered that decisions made under the 
76 ICANN, FAQs, What is ICANN, http://www.icann.org./faq/#WhatisICANN 
(last visited Mar. 19, 2006). 
77 WIPO, About WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/index.html?wipo~ 
content-frame=/about-wipo/en/gib.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2006). 
78 ICANN, Approved Providers for Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution 
Policy, http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/approved-providers.htm (last visited 
Mar. 19, 2006). 
While WIPO is the largest dispute resolution provider, in relation to domain 
name disputes, i t  must be remembered that there also are other providers of the 
same sort of service. At the time of writing, WIPO was one of four approved 
providers for ICANN's Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy. Id. 
79 ICANN, Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, http://www. 
icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2006). 
ICANN/WIPO arrangement very well may be challen 
courts or under other dispute resolution arrangements. 
makes the ICANNNVIPO model unique is that Internet-related 
disputes are, to an extent, separated from offline disputes.80 
ICANNNVIPO represents a model where the Internet is viewed as 
a separate "spacen- borders, although not very fir 
placed around the Internet. This can be contrasted to virtually all 
other areas (eg. defamation), where Internet activities are regu- 
lated in the same manner as "real world" activities-borders are 
placed on the Internet. Of course, it is much easier to disti 
domain name disputes from other IP disputes than it woul 
distinguish, for example, between online and offline defa 
Yet, perhaps similar organization should be established in order 
to keep disputes arising out of other Internet activities separate 
from offline disputes? Perhaps there is a need for Internet s 
regulations? Could further existing international coGrts, or specif- 
ically designed international courts for these purpose 
disputes arising from Internet activities? Or, perhaps 
of dispute resolution are better equipped to deal 
disputes? 
A. The Internet-Another (International) "Space"? 
Over the relatively short period of time since the intr 
the Internet, several models for self-regulation or "alter 
ulation" have been presented. Although the more extr 
have largely become a thing of the past,81 the debate goes on? 
so WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, Frequently Asked Questions: 
Internet Domain Names, http://arbiter.wipo.int/center/faq/domains.html (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2006) (explaining the type of disputes handled by WIPO: 
internet domain names disputes). 
See generally Barlow, supra note 3 (voicing his opposition to regulation in 
Cyberspace by "Governments of the Industrial World"). 
82 Perhaps particularly noteworthy is the discussion between Chicago law 
professor Jack Goldsmith on the one hand, and the prominent "cyber- 
libertarians" David Johnson and David Post on the other. The latest contribution 
being David Post's Against "Against Cyberanarchy" (a response to Goldsmith's 
Against Cyberanarchy). See Goldsmith, supra note 48, at  1199, 1200; David G. 
Post, Against "Against Cyberanarchy," 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1365, 1366 
(2002). There are also, of course, other contemporary or recent proponents of 
regulation resistance. See Sharnoil Shipchandler, Note, The Wild Wild Web: 
Non-Regulation as the Answer to the Regulatory Question, 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 
435, 461-63 (2000) (supporting self-regulation by Internet users and ISPs over 
government regulation of the Internet); Edward J. Valauskas, Lex Networkia: 
Understanding the Internet Community, FIRST MONDAY (1996), available at 
http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue4/valauskas/; Robert Corn-Revere, 
ICANNmIPO arrangement very well may be challenge 
courts or under other dispute resolution arrangements. 
makes the ICANNNVIPO model unique is that Internet-related 
disputes are, to  an extent, separated from offline disputes.80 
ICANN/WIPO represents a model where the Internet is viewed as 
a separate "space"- borders, although not very fi 
placed around the Internet. This can be contrasted to virtually all 
other areas (e.g. defamation), where Internet activities are regu- 
lated in the same manner as "real world" activities-borders are 
placed on the Internet. Of course, it is much easier to distinguish 
domain name disputes from other IP disputes than it would be to 
distinguish, for example, between online and offline defamation. 
Yet, perhaps similar organization should be established in order 
to keep disputes arising out of other Internet activities separate 
from offline disputes? Perhaps there is a need for Internet specific 
regulations? Could further existing international cotirts, or specif- 
ically designed international courts for these purposes, determine 
disputes arising from Internet activities? Or, perhaps other forms 
of dispute resolution are better equipped to deal with 
disputes? 
A. The Internet-Another (International) "Space"? 
Over the relatively short period of time since the introductio 
the Internet, several models for self-regulation or "alternative reg- 
ulation" have been presented. Although the more extre 
have largely become a thing of the past,81 the debate goes onOs2 
- - 
80 WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, Frequently Asked Questions: 
Internet Domain Names, http://arbiter.wipo.int/center/faq/dornains.htrnl (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2006) (explaining the type of disputes handled by WIPO: 
internet domain names disputes). 
See generally Barlow, supra note 3 (voicing his opposition to regulation in 
Cyberspace by "Governments of the Industrial World"). 
82 Perhaps particularly noteworthy is the discussion between Chicago law 
professor Jack Goldsmith on the one hand, and the prominent "cyber- 
libertarians" David Johnson and David Post on the other. The latest contribution 
being David Post's Against "Against Cyberanarchy" (a response to Goldsmith's 
Against Cyberanarchy). See Goldsmith, supra note 48, at 1199, 1200; David G. 
Post, Against "Against Cyberanarchy,,' 17  BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1365, 1366 
(2002). There are also, of course, other contemporary or recent proponents of 
regulation resistance. See Sharnoil Shipchandler, Note, The Wild Wild Web: 
Non-Regulation as the Answer to the Regulatory Question, 33 CORNELL INT'L L. J .  
435, 461-63 (2000) (supporting self-regulation by Internet users and ISPs over 
government regulation of the Internet); Edward J. Valauskas, Lex Networkia: 
Understanding the Internet Community, FIRST MONDAY (1996), available at 
http://www.firstmonday.dWissueslissue4/valauskas/; Robert Corn-Revere, 
One of the more widely achowle ged proposals for viewing the 
Internet as a separate space is found in ohnson and Post's Law 
And Borders -The Rise of Law i n  C y b e r s p a ~ e . ~ ~  The authors 
argue that the Internet should be viewed as a separate 
beyond the regulatory control of individual nations. Moreover, the 
article suggests that, t o  the extent that this separate space is to be 
regulated, such regulations would emerge in the form sf self- 
r e g ~ l a t i o n . ~ ~  
Although this approach does not seem realistic it is, in part, 
thought-provoking. Due to trust issues, it can safely be assumed 
that parties to contractual relations would not nefit from the 
Internet being viewed as a lawless dimension, b as an example 
it is interesting to consider the alternative in relation to  Internet 
ation. Leaving Internet defamation unre lated, or if pre- 
ferred, self-regulated, would carry both esirable and undesirable 
consequences. The most obvious benefit would be that no 'krtifi- 
cial" and more or less awed rules would have to be created in 
relation to jurisdiction claims over Internet defamation. There 
simply would not be such a phenomenon as Internet defamation- 
statements on the Internet could not be defamatory, Thereby a 
previously unseen total freedom of expression would be created, in 
relation to defamatory material. If this is accepted, self-regulation 
would presumably be achieved s a result of "serious" content 
oviders' desire to  remain credi e online as well as offline. Fur- 
er, the users of the Int Id have to  be aware of the fact 
.t information provid the Internet generally should be 
viewed with a great deal of skepticism and greater care would 
have to  be taken in determining w ch sources to rely on. The 
absence of threatening legal consequences would not necessarily 
lead to a wave of untrue allegations, at least not from serious con- 
tent providers. Already, people's trustin the accuracy of informa- 
tion is undeniably based, in part, on an evaluation of the source.86 
Caught in  the Seamless Web: Does the Internet's Global Reach Justify Less 
Freedom of Speech? 13, Briefing Paper of the Cato Institute, July 24, 2802, 
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/briefs/bp71.pd~ Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The 
Internet is Changing the Public International Law System, 88 KY. L.J. 885, 917 
(1999-2000). 
83 Johnson & Post, supra note 1, a t  1367. 
84 Id. a t  1367, 1378. 
85 Id. at 1367. 
86 See Tamar Frankel, Trusting and Nan-Trusting on the Internet, 81 B.U, L. 
REV. 457, 469, 477 (2001) (pointing out t h a t  "reputable institutions, 
intermediaries, verifiers and providers of trust services contribute to pu.blic 
trusting on the Internet"). 
E 1 NET 
The negative consequences of self-regulation are rather obvious. 
he fact that a person's reputation can be greatly damaged by 
information spread via the Internet is beyond intelligent dispute, 
and if there is no form of regulation, the individual has no chance 
to prevent damage or get compensation for damage made to  his/ 
her reputation. Furthermore, the general feeling of distrust 
towards the Internet would be amplified. The self-regulation advo- 
cates' arguments that people, or "netizens"-the citizens of the 
"netv-would move away from the disliked parts of the Internet, 
does not have much effect in relation to defamati~n.'~ A person is 
no less defamed by avoiding reading or viewing the defamatory 
material; just because a person avoids viewing certain websites, it 
does not mean that he or she runs any less risk of being defame 
1 on those websites. 
Taking a somewhat more practical approach, it woul 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to come to ad international 
agreement making the Internet a "defamation law-free zone" or a 
- 
lawless dimension in general. Governments all over the world 
have passed legislation aimed at regulating the Internet,'' 
already existing laws have been applied to activities on t 
Ir~ternet,'~ and international agreements have evolved to  regulate 
Internet behavior.g0 It would be unthinkable to  see the govern- 
87 David Post & David Johnson, The New Civic Virtue of the Net: Lessons from 
Models of Complex Systems for the Governance of Cyberspace (1997) [hereinafter 
Post & Johnson Working Paper] (unpublished working paper, on file with 
Stanford Technical Law Review), available at http:llstlr.stanford.eddSTEW 
Working-Papersl97-Post-1lindex.htm. 
8s See, e.g., Justin Hughes, The Internet and the Persistence of l a w ,  44 B.C. L. 
REV. 359, 360 (2003) ("In California, the state legislature saw 258 Internet- 
related bills introduced in its 1999-2000 session, up from four bills in 1994."). 
89 See It's in the Cards, Inc. v. Fuschetto, 535 N.W.2d 117 14 -15 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1995) ("Applying the present libel laws to cyberspace or computer networks 
entails rewriting statutes that were written to manage physical, printed objects, 
not computer networks or services. Consequently, it is for the legislature to 
address the increasingly common phenomenon of libel and defamation on the 
information superhighway."). 
See The Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001 
(Budapest), E.T.S. No, 185, available at http:l/conventions.coe.int/Treaty/ 
Treaties/Html/185,htm (attempting to create a unified international criminal 
regulatory policy against cybercrime generally, including such cybercrimes as 
child pornography, copyright infringement, Internet fraud) [hereinafter 
Convention on Cybercrime]. See also Peter Csonka, The Council of Europe 
Convention on Cyber-Crime: A Response to the Challenge of the New Age, in 
CYBER-CRIME: THE CHALLENGE IN ASIA 303 (Roderic Broadhurst & Peter 
Grabosky eds., 2005) (explaining that the Council of Europe's Cyber Crime 
Convention has been signed by 37 states, including the U.S. and Sweden, ratified 
by eight, and entered into force on July 2004). 
ments of the world all agreeing not to  apply their laws to the 
Internet in favor of making the Internet a lawless dimension or 
leaving it to "self regulation." There must be another well-work- 
ing means of regulation to replace national laws if states were 
ever to be inclined to cease making jurisdictional claims over 
Internet activity. Anything else would arguably be irresponsible. 
It is argued that the Internet more accurately should be seen as a 
common thing, rather than "a thing of no one"; thus, states have a 
common obligation to  regulate it, while at the same time observ- 
ing the interests of other states and the overall common interest of 
a healthy development of Internet technologies. If this is 
accepted, large parts of Johnson and Post's ideas carry mainly the- 
oretical valueg1 
Viewing the Internet as a separate "space" also creates severe 
practical complications. Any model attempting to make the 
Internet a separate space, with or without separate regulation, 
would be faced with questions such as: What takes place in the 
"real" world, and what takes place in the Internet space? Which 
rules should govern a contract that is formed via the Internet but 
performed in the real world? Does an act of defamation take place 
in the real world or in Internet space, if a person receives and 
prints a defamatory e-mail and only ever reads the printed copy? 
With these types of questions in mind, I cannot subscribe to John- 
son and Post's following statement: 
Treating Cyberspace as a separate "space" to  which distinct laws 
apply should come naturally. There is a "placeness" to Cyberspace 
because the messages accessed there are persistent and accessible to 
many people. Furthermore, because entry into this world of stored 
online communications occurs through a screen and (usually) a pass- 
word boundary, you know when you are "there." No one accidentally 
strays across the border into Cyberspace. To be sure, Cyberspace is 
not a homogenous place; groups and activities found at various 
online locations possess their own unique characteristics and dis- 
tinctions, and each area will likely develop its own set of distinct 
rules. But the line that separates online transactions from our deal- 
ings in the real world is just as distinct as the physical boundaries 
between our territorial governments-perhaps more so. 
91 It is noteworthy that Johnson & Post's article, Law And Borders-The Rise 
of Law in Cyberspace was published in 1996. Since then, numerous things have 
changed, indicating their article was arguably more realistic at the time of 
publication. Johnson & Post, supra note 1, at 1367. 
Crossing into Cyberspace is a meaningful act  that would make  appli- 
cation of a distinct "law of Cyberspace" fair to those who pass  over 
the  electronic boundary.92 
In addition, the statements made by Hughes, Johnson, and Post 
seem to be much less true today than when they were first made. 
As Hughes postulated "[tlhe Internet is being woven into the rest 
of reality-technologically, socially, and economically. As our 
appliances become 'smart,' our houses become 'wired,' our teleph- 
ony is done with packet-switching, and our cable, telephone, and 
Internet services bundle and unbundle, will we know when we 
'crossed' the cyberspace border?"93 In other words, will we, in the 
view of Johnson and Post, be crossing the border and entering 
"Cyberspace5' when getting a beer out of our network-connected 
fridgeP4 
If the Internet is to be made into a separate legal space, is it 
necessary to  have well thought-out and harmonized rules to deter- 
mine which disputes are Internet disputes and which disputes are 
off-line? 
B. Adding Public International Law 
Darrel Menthe also approaches the Internet as a separate 
space.95 In his view, this separate space should be treated as 
another international space, similar to the high seas, 
and outer space (i.e., as an independent internati 
beyond individual nations' regulati~n):~" 
92 Id. a t  1379 (footnotes omitted). 
93 Hughes, supra note 88, a t  371. 
94 After all, since a network-connected fridge can both track food-items and 
order more items online, it could be argued that the act of taking a beer out of the 
fridge crosses the border into cyberspace. See Leander Kahney, The Coolest 
Internet Appliance, WIRED NEWS, Feb. 12, 1999, available at  http://www.wired. 
com/news/technology/0,1282,17872,00.html (describing an Internet-connected 
refrigerator marketed by Electrolux that has the capability to re-order food items 
as needed). 
95 Darrel C. Menthe, Jurisdiction in  Cyberspace: A Theory of International 
Spaces, 4 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 69,71(1998). Menthe has explicitly 
limited his observations to so-called prescriptive jurisdiction or jurisdiction to 
prescribe laws. From a public international law perspective, determining a 
state's jurisdiction to prescribe law obviously does just that; it determines to 
what extent a state can prescribe laws. Id. As noted above, from a court's 
perspective, prescriptive jurisdiction is a factor taken into account in 
determining the applicable law. See id. a t  73. In practice, however, states' 
choice of law rules seldom offend the limits of public international law under the 
rules for prescriptive jurisdiction. Id. a t  77. 
96 Id. at 83. 
These three physical spaces are nothing at all like cyberspace which 
is a non-physical space. The physicallnon-physical distinction, how- 
ever, is only one of so many distinctions which could be made 
between these spaces. after all, one could hardly posit three more 
dissimilar physicalities-the ocean, a continent, and the sky. What 
makes them analogous is not any physical similarity, but their inter- 
national, sovereignless quality. These three, like cyberspace, are 
international spaces.97 
efore continuing to explore Menthe's theories, it is necessary 
to briefly venture out on an exploratory excursion of some jurisdic- 
tional theories of public international law. It is frequently said 
that there are six different grounds for jurisdiction under public 
international law (sometimes, however, the two ounds based on 
territoriality are viewed as one, of course, resulting in only five 
t h e ~ r i e s ) : ~ ~  the subjective territoriality the objective 
territoriality principle,loO the nationality principle,*O1 the passive 
personality principle,lo2 the protective principle,lo3 and the 
universality principle. lo4 The relationship between these some- 
times overlapping principles are occasionally ranked in order of 
riority. However, such rankings are prone to  be subjectively 
~nfluenced. The only general observation that realistically could 
be made is that the territoriality principles and the nationality 
rinciples appear to  be the most widely accepted.lo5 
97 Id .  at  85. 
98 See, e.g. TIM HILLIER, SOURCEBOOK ON PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 253 
(1998) (listing the general principles of jurisdiction). 
99 The subjective territoriality principle of jurisdiction is based on the idea 
that the offending activity takes place within the territory of the forum. See IAN 
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 303-06 (5 th ed. 1998). 
loo Objective territoriality is jurisdiction based on the idea that the offending 
activity, while taking place outside the territory of the forum, has its primary 
effect within the territory of the forum. See id. 
lof The nationality principle refers to jurisdiction based on the nationality of 
the offending party being that of the forum. Id.  at 306. 
lo2 Id.  at 306-07. "According to [the passive personality] principle aliens may 
be punished for acts abroad harmful to nationals of the forum." Id. at 306. 
lo3 Also referred to as the security principle, the protective principle 
implicates "jurisdiction [assumed] over aliens for acts done abroad which affect 
the security of the state." Id.  at 307. 
Io4 Under this principle, a state may claim jurisdiction over non-nationals 
acting inside or outside the state's territory. The principle is, however, only 
applicable in relation to certain particularly offensive crimes, such as piracy. Id. 
at 307-08. 
Io5 See BROWNLIE, supra note 99, at  306, 309-10 (explaining how territorial 
and nationality principles are closely related, and how their broad principles 
have been adopted within various European provisions). 
Having illustrated how there are currently three international 
spaces, and that "cyberspace9' should be the fourth, 
describes how the "nationality principle9' has been applied t o  regu- 
late behavior in these spaces.lo6 In doing so, he notes that all 
three international spaces rely on the nationality principle (for 
example, the "law of the flag" from maritime law),lo7 and he points 
out that "a webpage would be ascribed the nationality of its crea- 
tor, and thus not be subject to the law of wherever it happened to  
be d o ~ n l o a d i e d . ~ ' ~ ~ ~  A side issue here is that Menthe acknowledges 
that placing the focus on the creator of the website is not always 
the only option: " [ webpages are now also created by individuals 
and companies for others. This makes us ask who 'owns' the page 
for jurisdictional purposes-the creator or the person on whose 
behalf it is maintained?"log In answering this question he states 
that '"[international law is not displeased with either answer. If a 
nation wishes, it can ascribe nationality to all webpages main- 
tained 'on behalf of its citizens, as well as any webpages actually 
created (i.e. uploaded) by its citizens."l1•‹ In the context of how to 
ermine the nationality of actions taking place in "cyber~pace~~, 
nthe also notes that "[a] person who follows a link is simply a 
ownloader, and is subject to the territorial jurisdiction of the key- 
board at which he or she sits, as well as the laws governing per- 
sons of his or her nationality in cyberspace. ,1111 
It is this mixture of the obvious, reasonable, and undisputed on 
the one hand, and the seemingly reasonable, but outrageously 
unreasonable on the other, that makes Menthe's article so decep- 
tive. While it is obvious, reasonable, and undisputed that a state 
cannot regulate what the citizens of another state download, act- 
ing in their home state, it is hopefully unthinkable, often unrea- 
sonable, and frequently unjust to give exclusivity to  the 
nationality principle. It is submitted that Menthe underestimates 
the importance of the fact that the so-called cyberspace is non- 
physical. The non-physical nature of Internet events result in 
much more direct consequences in the jurisdictions of the world 
than events occurring in the other three international spaces do. 
To illustrate the implications of the Internet's non-physical 
m6 Menthe, supra note 95, at 83. 
Id. at 83-84. 
lo8 Id. at 74. 
log Id. at 93. 
11•‹ Id. at 93-94. 
111 Id. at 94. 
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nature, we can simply consider the difference between placing a 
defamatory message on the Internet compared to placing the same 
message on the high sea, Antarctica, or in outer space. When 
placed on the Internet, the message can be read, and cause dam- 
age, in virtually every country on the planet due to the accessibil- 
ity of material in cyberspace. In contrast, a message placed in an 
international space is extremely unlikely to  ever even be noted by 
anybody. On a less serious note, it could be noted that, "in space 
no one can hear you scream,"l12 so there would be no defamation 
at all under the rules of many, not to say most, countries since the 
defamatory material entering the mind of a third person is often a 
requirement for an actionable defamation.'13 
As argued by Goldsmith: 
Cyberspace transactions are no different from "real-space" transna- 
tional transactions. They involve people in real space in one jurisdic- 
tion communicating with people in real space in other jurisdictions 
in a way that often does good but sometimes causes harm. There is 
no general normative argument that supports the immunization of 
cyberspace activities from territorial regulation. A-nd there is every 
reason to believe that nations can exercise territorial authority to 
achieve significant regulatory control over cyberspace 
transactions. 'I4 
Even if "cyberspace" was to  be viewed as a separate interna- 
tional space, its non-physical nature motivates the application of 
both the subjective and the objective territoriality principles in 
some cases. In addition, in a situation where the security of a 
state is threatened, by a computer virus for example, it is possible 
that states would claim jurisdiction based on the protective princi- 
ple. With this in mind, there is no good reason to  rely exclusively 
on the nationality principle, as far as Internet activities are 
concerned. 
In fact, the better view is to  see the non-physical nature of 
cyberspace as being of such a fundamental importance in the con- 
text of jurisdictional issues, that any comparison with physical 
international spaces is made impossible. Before moving away 
from the comparison between cyberspace and the three interna- 
tional spaces, at least two more fundamental differences should be 
112 A line made famous by the 1979 cult-movie Alien. 
113 It is very common that defamation laws require the defamatory message to 
have entered the mind of a third person for there to be an actionable defamation. 
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 0 558 (2000) (stating the elements of 
defamation). 
Goldsmith, supra note 48, at 1250. 
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noted. As pointed out by Perritt, the Internet's "low economic bar- 
riers of entry . . . distinguish it sharply from outer space regula- 
tion [as well as the regulation of Antarctica] and moderately from 
law of the sea."'15 Further, he notes that "these regulatory 
regimes focus on state actors rather than private actors, and thus 
make them unsuitable conceptual models for Internet regulation 
of many thousands of private actors. ,7116 
Against this background it would seem that, as far as Internet 
regulation is concerned, only very limited lessons can be drawn 
from the development of the three international spaces. One such 
lesson is that the development of international regulation often, 
but not always, is fairly slow and effort-intensive. 
From the above, it should at the very least be obvious that if the 
Internet is to be treated as a separate legal space, then that space 
needs to be regulated, not left with the hope of some form of self- 
regulation emerging. The "community feeling," emphasized by 
early c~mmenta to r s l~~  cannot be relied upon to provide effective 
regulation of today's Internet. In this context it is submitted that 
if one proposes self-regulation, it is also necessary to examine 
from which sources that regulation will emerge, and what the 
underlying driving forces for the development of these particular 
forms of regulation are. As Lawrence Lessig illustrated, the 
absence of governmental control might not at all be in the public's 
best interest: 
There is nothing to guarantee that the regime of values constituted 
by code [i.e. Internet architecture] will be a liberal regime; and little 
reason to expect that an invisible hand of code writers will plash it in 
that direction. Indeed, to the extent that code writers respond to the 
wishes of commerce, a power to control may well be the tilt that this 
code begins to take.'18 
In other words, the absence of governmental intervention is no 
guarantee for liberal self-regulation, but may rather be an invita- 
tion to corporate control. However, as noted by Franz 6 ,  Mayer, 
- -- - -- 
115 Perritt, supra note 82, at 923-24. 
116 Id. at 924. 
Il7 See, e.g. Valauskas, supra note 82 (suggesting that evolved internet 
communities have created their own method of regulation that should be 
considered by legislatures). 
Il8 Lessig, supra note 59, at  548. 
Lessig9s observation is merely the beginning of a much needed 
iscussion: 
Lessig does not bring his argument to  a satisfactory conclusion and 
does not inquire about the appropriate arena for this kind of regula- 
tory problem: from an international law perspective, the most 
intriguing aspect of Lessig's book [Code is Law] is that he barely 
mentions international law a t  all, instead he remains focused on 
intra-American dichotomies such as West Coast (computer) code ver- 
sus East Coast (legal) code. If it is correct that liberty in cyberspace 
will not come from the absence of the state, but from the state of a 
certain kind, as Lessig claims (p. 5), the question arises whether 
that authority should be that of one particular state or whether it 
should not be exercised by the community of states on the interna- 
tional level. l'' 
A. Separate Regulation 
If rules can be used to  properly draw lines between online and 
offline activities, national laws could be replaced by a uniform 
code for the Internet legal space. Different theories as to how 
future Internet regulation will evolve have been presented. Mat- 
thew Pagin has made one of the more interesting observations: 
In the future, Internet regulation will require international arrange- 
ments that transcend state borders and originate beyond indepen- 
dent state governmental processes; collective efforts that arise either 
through private enterprise by non-state entities, such as technical- 
standards bodies, or governmental collaboration. In these areas, the 
Internet encourages the internalization of international law.120 
Fagin's point about how "the Internet encourages the internal- 
ization of international law" is of particular relevance for this arti- 
cle in that one of the main points being made here is that the 
complications stemming from the Internet's particular set of char- 
acteristics are best addressed through. an  international 
instrument.12' 
Another take on the development of a regulative structure is 
presented in Viktor Mayer-Schonberger and Teree Foster's article 
A Regulatory Web: Free Speech and the Global Information Infra- 
-- 
119 Franz C. Mayer, The Internet and Public International Law - Worlds 
Apart?, 12 EUR. 5. INT'L L. 617, 620 (2001) (the page reference refers ko Zessig's 
book, Code is Law (1999)). 
Iz0 Matthew Fagin, Comment, Regulating Speech Across Borders: Technology 
us. Values, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 395, 448 (2003). 
lZ1 Id. 
structure.122 In the context of free speech they suggest that "a 
method should be devised for defining certain categories of speech 
that will be subject to regulation, while at the same time staunchly 
protecting all speech not within these categories In aiming at  a 
method providing a broad multi-national and multi-cultural con- 
sensus they point to the international concept of jus cogens .I2* 
the Vienna Convention, jus cogens is given the following defini- 
tion: '"A] norm accepted and recognized by the international com- 
munity of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is 
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm 
of general international law having the same character. 7,125 
While, as is reflected in the Cybercrime Treaty,126 Mayer- 
Schonberger and Foster's observation that "jus cogens represents 
a corpus of international law rules that are binding upon every 
nation and every people"127 is undeniably true, and it provides a 
good starting point for the first half of their desired aim, it 
not provide any solid base as far as the second half of their aim is 
concerned. t is, as illustrated in practice, possible to gain consen- 
sus in defi ng certain forms of communication that are univer- 
sally deemed undesirable (e.g., child-pornography). However, that 
does not mean that all states would be willing to give up their 
regulation of all other forms sf communication (e.g., subversive 
material). In a world where, in one country, a picture of a woman 
(otherwise fully dressed) showin her hair is illegal, and posno- 
graphic movies are legally shown in picture theatres (be as it may 
with age restrictions) in another country, it is difficult to  imagine 
the development Mayer-Schonberger and Foster aim at becoming 
a reality. With this in mind, it could be said that, while it has 
proven possible to  agree upon some things that are illegal, unlaw- 
ful and undesirable, it is much harder, not to say impossible, to 
agree upon what otherwise is in fact legal, lawful and desirable. 
122 Viktor Mayer-Schonberger & Teree E. Foster, A Regulatory Web: Free 
Speech and the Global Information Infrastructure, 3 MICH. TELEGOMM. & TECH. 
L. REV. 45 (1997). 
123 Id. at 57 (emphasis added). 
124 Id. at 57-58. 
125 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 8 I.L.M. 
679, 698-99. 
126 Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 90. 
Mayer-Schonberger & Foster, supra note 122, at 59. 
. Separate Judiciary 
Even with a regulatory scheme in place, it is, of course, also nec- 
essary to have some organ supervising compliance with any sepa- 
rate rules and adjudicating disputes arising from those rules. 
Such a body must further have some effective means for ensuring 
ecisions are enforced. 
tional courts are not a new idea, but so far they exist 
only in very limited and specialised contexts.lZ8 A specific court 
responsible for all Internet activities is unlikely to ever become a 
reality. At the same time, however, one cannot ignore the devel- 
f Online Dispute Resolution (ODR). ODR, is best 
as a branch of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR).129 
chnology is not only the cause of disputes, but can also 
eans for dispute resolution. There is a range of ADR 
schemes, such as in-house complaints offices, mediation and arbi- 
tration, available online.130 A full discussion of these schemes, 
their advantages and disadvantages and so on, is clearly beyond 
the scope of this article.lsl However, in the context of a separate 
judiciary for Internet conflicts, the experiences from ODR should 
not be overlooked. 
More importantly, ODR might be the most effective remedy for 
one of the problems created by Internet communication's particu- 
lar set of characteristics. Even the most cleverly drafted private 
international law rules simply cannot solve the problem of the 
imbalance between the ease and cost-effectiveness of cross-border 
contacts on the one hand, and the difficulty and expense of solving 
er disputes on the other. Unless we want t o  make it 
ore difficult and expensive to  enter into cross-border contacts, 
which would defeat very important benefits of the Internet, we 
have to create easier access to dispute resolution. The costs 
involved in court proceedings fit uneasily with the small values 
involved in many online contracts, and many, not to say most, 
court systems are notoriously slow. In fact, it could be said that 
the legal system does not provide for any reasonable dispute reso- 
128 For example, the International Court of Justice, International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea and the Bosnia War Crimes Tribunal. 
129 Lee Bygrave, Online Dispute Resolution - What it Means for Consumers, 4 
INTERNET LAW BULLETIN Vo1. 81, 8 (2002). 
130 See, e.g., http://www.ombuds.org/center/onlineadr.html (last visited Mar. 
19, 2006) (providing links to a range of different ODR websites). 
131 There has been a range of material published on this topic. See, e.g., 
Bygrave, supra note 129, at  1; ETHAN KATSH & JANET RIFKIN, ONLINE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION: RESOLVING CONFLICTS IN CYBERSPACE (2001). 
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lution option in relation to many small value contracts. This in 
turn could lead to the suggestion that alternatives must be devel- 
oped in order to provide an appropriate level of access to  justice. 
VI. A MODEL FOR PLACING BORDERS 
AROUND INTERNET DEFAMATION 
To be useful, any exploration of the possibilities of treating spe- 
cific aspects of Internet activities separately, with separate regu- 
lation and judicial system, should focus on one specific legal area 
at a time. As each legal area gives rise to its own set of concerns, 
it would be impractical to address all areas in one study. This 
part of the article outlines one possible approach to placing bor- 
ders around Internet defamation. 
As noted above, a defamation dispute is essentially an exercise 
in balancing freedom of expression and the right of ereputation. It 
has been noted that "[tlhe most obvious area of law where the 
Internet is unlikely to  produce substantial harmonization of legal 
norms in the medium term is freedom of expression. ,2132 m i l e  
this claim makes sense as far as absolute worldwide harmoniza- 
tion is concerned, it becomes incorrect when the term "worldwide" 
is not taken literally. In a sense, there has already been substan- 
tial harmonization in the area of freedom of expression. The Inter- 
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),133 which 
could be said to be a codification of parts of the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, represents a minimum standard of 
freedom of expression, as well as the protection of reputation, in 
signatory states. In accordance with Article 19: 
I. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without 
interference. 
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right 
shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or 
in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice. 
132 Hughes, supra note 88, at 364. 
133 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 
available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/pdE/ccpr.pdf [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
As of the 13th of December 2005, no less than 154 states (including Sweden, 
Australia, the PRC and the US) have become parties to the ICCPR. Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ratifications and 
Reservations: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/raticatiod4.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 
2006). 
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this arti- 
cle carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may there- 
fore be subject to  certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as 
are provided by law and are necessary: 
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; 
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre 
public), or of public health or rnorals.13* 
ticle illustrates that freedom of expression is a funda- 
man right, but it also allows for restrictions of this 
right. Since t e ICCPR also establishes a minimum standard of 
irectly opposite to  freedom of e~press ion , '~~  it is submitted 
ICCCPR and its associated establish the 
outer limits of the allowable spectrum of the balancing between 
freedom of expression and competing rights. Each signatory state 
is allowed to strike its own balance between freedom of expression 
eting rights, as long as that balance falls within the 
spectrum provided for under the CCPR. Using the defamation 
laws of Australia and the United States as examples, it can be 
noted that Australia has placed a greater emphasis on the right of 
reputation, while the United States has placed a greater emphasis 
on freedom of expression; however, both states' balances arguably 
fall within the ICCPR's allowable spectrum. Consequently, from 
this perspective, harmonization of the substantive law has 
to a certain extent. Further, it is interesting to note that, 
on the states, the First Optional P r o t o ~ o l l ~ ~  of 
es for a form of adjudication by a supranational 
body-the United Nation's Human Rights Committee (UNHRC). 
Although so far not all of the states that have signed the ICC 
ed the First Optional Protocol,ls8 this is an example of 
134 ICCPR, supra note 133, at 6 (emphasis added). 
135 See, e.g., id. at 5-6 (noting the existence of limitations in Article 19, and 
explicitly stating in Article 17 that "[nlo one shall be subjected to arbitrary or 
unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to 
unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation"). 
136 Such documents include the general comments and individual decisions 
under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. 
137 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, March 23, 1976, available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/pdE/ccpr- 
one.pdf. 
138 AS of the 13th of December 2005, 105 states have become parties to the 
First Optional Protocol (including Sweden and Australia). Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ratifications and Reservations: 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
http://www.ohcbr.org/englisWcountries/raticatio.ht (last visited Mar. 19, 
2006). 
harmonization of substantive law un er the supervision of a 
supranational body. 
The UNHRC has already received communication asking it to 
determine a dispute relating to Internet defamation. Having lost 
in the High Court of Australia, the team of lawyers sought a fresh 
avenue to challenge Australia's jurisdictional claim in the defama- 
tion dispute between Joseph Gutnick and Dow Jones. The author 
of the allegedly efamatory article, Alpert, has petitioned to 
the UMHRC in n attempt to  hav e Australian standpoint 
declared to be in violation of the ICC 39 This was possible due 
to the fact that Australia, in contrast to Mr. Alpert's home coun- 
try, the United States of America, has signed the First Optional 
Protocol (OP-I)140 of the ICCPR. It may here be mentioned that 
the OP-l thus does not allow Dow Jones (a business entity) to  
lodge an application, and an application can only be lodge 
against the conduct of state parties, in this ca 
trast to the plaintiff of the disputed action, 
C has not yet dealt with the matter. 
VII. A MODEL CONVENTION TO LATE CROSS-BORDER 
EFAMATION 
ASS-COMMUNICATION 
To provide a starting point for how borders may be 
around Internet defamation, a suggeste Model Convention to 
regulate cross-border Internet defamation arising out of mass- 
communication is outlined below. 
This Model takes existing framework provided throu 
ICCPR and the UN as its point of departure.141 Cross- 
disputes relating to situations where material is lawful from 
where it is made available, but unlawful in some other state, and 
that latter state is asked t o  exercise jurisdiction over the 
responsible for the material being made available, are to be 
decided by a special su 1 of the UNH . In contrast, dis- 
putes relating to  situati ere the releva aterial is unlaw- 
139 Fergus Shiel, Journalist Appealing to UN Over Gutnick Case, THE AGE, 
Apr. 17, 2003, http://www.tbeage.com.adarticle~/2003/04/16/1050172650855~ 
html. 
140 The Optional Protocol to  the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (CCPR-OPl), Dec. 16, 1966. 
"I See Human Rights Library, International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, available at http://wwwl.umn.ed~umanrts/instree/b3ccpr.htm (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2006) (using a similar layout sf Sections, Articles, and 
subdivisions). 
ful, both where it was uploaded and where it was downloaded, 
remain matters for the national courts. 
ught before the special Internet Defamation Panel 
are to be determined by reference to the minimum 
standard for freedom of speech and right of reputation set by the 
. This way, the Model ensures a high level of freedom of 
speech, as well as a reasonable level of protection for the right of 
reputation, in relation to the types of Internet communication it 
covers. 
Accession 
is to regulate cross-border Internet defamation 
ass-communication. 
1 have discussed the potential benefits of rules 
eutral. However, if we are to draft an instru- 
ment that separates online behavior from offline behavior, then 
such an approach is, of course, not possible. On the other hand, 
we can not allow rules to be too technology-specific either. This 
roposal is therefore aimed at  all forms of communication used for 
mass-communication via the Internet. 
efamation is not to be governed by this 
Convention. 
aragraph one does not prevent the application of this Con- 
vention to  civil liability arising as a consequence of criminal 
efmation is a politically sensitive area of law, 
particularly as far as criminal defamation is concerned, it was 
deemed suitable to refrain from regulating the criminal aspects of 
efamation law. However, as is made clear in Article 2(2), this is 
not to prevent the application of the Model to civil claims associ- 
ated with criminal actions, as long as the requirements set out in 
en for signature by states that have previ- 
e required ratified, both of the following 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
The Optional Protocol to  the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political 
142 Svantesson, supra note 2, a t  96-98, 
As the possibility of placing reliance on the practice of the UN 
Human Rights Committee, or a sub-panel of the UP6 
Rights Committee, is a central function of the odel, it can only 
be opened to  states that already provide for such a procedure. 
Therefore, the Model is open only to states that have already 
signed and ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Politi- 
cal Rights and the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights. 
Although Article 3 sets up rather strict requirements for acces- 
sion, a large number of states nevertheless qualify. There are, 
however, some rather important exceptions, such as the 
Republic of China, the UM, and the US, because these states have 
chosen not to sign the Optional Protocol to the International Cove- 
nant on Civil and Political Rights.143 
Article 4 
For the purpose of this Convention the following terms bear the 
meaning outlined in this Article: 
'Yoreign defendant" means a defendant that "acted" outside the 
jurisdiction of the court; 
"Internet defamation" means alleged defamation occurring as a 
consequence of material being communicated y the use of the 
Internet; 
(4 r n a ~ ~ - ~ ~ m m ~ n i ~ a t i ~ n "  means communication that is not aime 
at one specific individual; 
"the Panel" means the UNH C Panel on Internet 
(to be created). 
The first problem facing an attempt to  regulate Internet activi- 
ties separately is, as hinted at above, the difficulty of separating 
what constitutes Internet activity and what does not constitute 
Internet activity. Such a distinction can be drawn in many differ- 
ent ways. It is submitted that, in this context, the best way is to  
focus on whether the communication took place, wholly or in part, 
via the Internet. Thus, the focal point is placed on the mode of 
communication rather than the medium used by a third person in 
having the allegedly defamatory material enter his or her mind. 
The consequence of this is, for example, a situation where the 
defamatory material is posted on a website, downloaded an 
printed, and then the defamation is classed as Internet defama- 
-- -- - - - 
CCPR-OP1, supra note 140. 
tion even though the person reading the defamatory material 
not read it on the screen, but from a printed document. 
Such a reference point may be undesirably inclusive, so further 
refinement is called for. There seems to be no real reason why 
one-to-one communication should be dealt with under this instru- 
ment simply due to the fact that it occurs online. hus , communi- 
cation using applications such as e-mail and Voic over IP (VoIP) 
would not fall under this Model Convention unless it is used to  
communicate to  more than one person at the time. 
Article 4 also makes clear the eaning of the terms "foreign 
defendant" and "the panel." However, it should be noted that the 
exact coastr-kaction of the uires further 
to Paragra e place where the defen- 
means the defendant is habitually 
resident. 
. A natural person shall be considered to  be resident - 
erson is resident in only one state, in that state; 
if that person is resident in more than one state, 
in the state in which t erson has his or her principal resi- 
ence; or 
if that person oes not have a principal residence in any one 
state, in each state in which that person is resident. 
3. For the purposes of this Article, an entity or person other 
than a natural person shall esed to be ha itually resident 
in the stat;! where it has it rincipal place sf business. 
4. If there is no, or merely a coinci tal, relevant nexus 
between the defendant's injuring act a e place identified 
under Paragr hs 1-3, "the place where ndant acted" shall 
be deemed to  the place that has the most substantial connec- 
tion with the defendant's act. 
ere a party attempts t o  break existing connecting factors 
with m e  state or attempts to create connecting factors with 
another state, in order to circumvent actual natural connections 
with "the place where the defendant acted," as defined in 
Paragraphs 1-4, such attempts shall be null and void. 
Article 5 defines the key concept of "the place where the defen- 
dant acted." The motivation for focusing on "habitual residence," 
instead of, for example, domicile or nationality, is found in its 
international recognition. As noted by Nygl.1, although never 
defined, "[tlhe term 'habitual residence9 is an old standby of the 
T 
Hague Convention with a history of over 100 years 
trast to  domicile, it further has the advantage of not 
ated with differing national meanings. 
The definition of the residence of "an entity or person other than 
a natural person" as being the "state where it has its principal 
place of business" is supported, for example, by the Australian 
Law Reform C o m m i ~ s i o n , ~ ~ ~  but obviously only represents one 
possible option. However, it would seem likely that the principle 
place of business ordinarily is of more relevance than, for example, 
the place of incorporation. 
While applying to  the question of jurisdiction, Article 5(4) has 
its origins in the flexibility of the applicable choice of law rules of, 
for example, the UK and Hong Kong SAR,146 and the US.147 It is 
necessary to leave room for these sorts of exceptions in certain 
cases. If, for example, a publishing company is located in 
but the allegedly defamatory article is researched, 
uploaded from South Africa onto a server located in South Africa, 
and the article is concerned with events and people in South 
Africa, there may be reasons to focus on the actual "place where 
the defendant acted" rather than on the habitl~al 
dence. Obviously, both the advantage a sadvantage of 
this Article is the extent of its flexibility. 
Today's technology with its portability an high level of ano- 
nymity provides a perfect environment for so-calle fraudulent 
evasions or fraude b la loi For example, connecting factors can 
144 Peter Nygh, The Preliminary Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and 
Foreign Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in  Civil and Commercial Matters, 
in INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT OF LAWS FOR THE THIRD MILLENNIUM: ESSAYS IN 
HONOR OF FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER 271 (Patrick J. Borchers st Joachim Zekoll eds., 
2001). 
145 Choice of Law, ALRC 58, 8 6.57 (1992), available at http://www.austlii.edu. 
au/aha/other/alrc/jpublications/reports/58/58.pdf. 
146 See Chaplin v. Boys, 1971 L.R. 356, 357 (A.C. 1969) ('"Given the general 
rule the necessary flexibility can be obtained through segregation of the relevant 
issue and consideration whether, in relation to that issue, the relevant rule ought 
as a matter of policy to be applied."). 
147 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 5 150 (1969) (explaining 
that rights and liabilities from defamatory matter are determined by the local 
law of the state with the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the 
parties under the principles stated in 5 6). For an illustration of how the factors 
listed in 8 6 are applied in a cross-border defamation case, see Hammer 
DeRoburt v. Gannet Co., 83 F.R.D. 574, 578-79 (1979) (listing and discussing 
each of the 8 6 factors in turn). 
148 fiaude a la loi is the "fraudulent evasion of a statute or provision." WIPO, 
Ad djibc Informal Meeting on the Protection of Audiovisual Performances (Nov. 6- 
7,  2003) (Geneva). 
be created andlor broken by moving a website from one server to 
another, changing the physical location of a server, or simply by 
downloading something onto your laptop after crossing the geo- 
graphical border to another country. The need to prevent such 
practice has gained remarkably little attention in discussions of 
Internet regulation. Article 5(5 )  represents a safety mechanism to 
prevent perversion of the Model's application through fraudulent 
evasion, for example, through a publisher seeking to  make a par- 
ticular location appear to be the appropriate focal point instead of 
the location that should be the focal point in the absence of the 
fraude a la loi. 
Section 111 : Juris 
Article 6 
1. A court of a Convention Sate may only claim jurisdiction over 
a foreign defendant, in a matter falling within the scope of this 
Convention, where it is satisfied that: 
a) the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case against the 
defendant under the law of the forum; and 
b) the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case against the 
defendant under the law of the place where the defendant acted. 
2. Where the plaintiff has satisfied the court that it can estab- 
lish a prima facie case against the defendant under the law of the 
forum, it is presumed that it also has such an action under the law 
of the place where the defendant acted. 
Article 6 is one of the two key provisions of the Convention 
Model. It draws upon the so-called double actionability test 
expressed in the old English case Phillips u. Eyre: 
As a general rule, in order to found a suit in England for a 
wrong alleged to have been committed abroad, two conditions 
must be fulfilled. First, the wrong must be of such a character that 
it would have been actionable if committed in England . . . Sec- 
ondly, the act must not have been justifiable by the law of the 
place where it was done.14' 
This rule has been criticized and recently abolished as the 
choice of law rule in Australia and some other common law juris- 
dictions.15* Yet that does not prevent it from being a useful point 
149 Phillips v. Eyre, 6 L.R.-Q.B. 1,28-29 (1870); see also DICEY AND MORRIS ON 
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1560 -65 (Lawrence Collins et al. eds., 13th ed. 2000). 
150 The double actionability test is still relevant in relation to actions in 
defamation in the UK, although it was abandoned in relation to other matters. 
See Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1995, c. 16 $5 10- 
13 (Eng.). 
of departure for the Model proposed here. 
T T 
The idea is t 
national court will continue to  deal with those disputes where the 
defendant has acted contrary to the law of both the place it acted 
and the place where the action is brought. Such disputes are not 
particularly controversial and may be dealt with under national 
law. 
Article 6 does, however, also contain the weakest part of the 
proposed Model-a national court will be asked to evaluate the 
validity of the claim already at the stage of determining whether 
it can claim jurisdiction. While this is not an entirely unique situ- 
ation, it is nevertheless a problem. The problem is partly limited 
by the presumption that, where the plaintiff has satisfied the 
court that he, or she, can establish a prima facie case against the 
defendant under the law of the forum, he or she also has such an 
action under the law of the place where the defendant acted. This 
also highlights that the burden of proof is divided between the 
parties. For the court to claim jurisdiction, the plaintiff has to  
show that it has a prima facie case against the defendant under 
the law of the forum. To avoid the court claiming jurisdiction, 
where the plaintiff has succeeded in proving that he, or she, has 
got a prima facie case against the defendant under the law of t  
forum, the defendant has to show that the plaintiff does not have 
a prima facie case against him, or her, under the law of the place 
where the defendant acted. 
Ordinarily, the court will be in a good position to evaluate 
whether the plaintiff has succeeded in proving that he, or she, can 
establish a prima facie case against the defendant under the law 
of the forum. However, expert evidence is likely to be required to  
establish whether or not the defendant has shown that the plain- 
tiff does not have a prima facie case under the law of the place 
where the defendant acted. 
Article 7 
The Panel has jurisdiction to  hear all disputes involving cross- 
border Internet defamation arising out of mass-communication. 
Article 7 makes clear that, even where a plaintiff could have 
brought an action before a national court, it may bring the 
falling within the scope of the oposed Model, before the 
Section W. 0 
Article 8 
1. The Panel is to decide the dispute by reference to whether a 
national court, of a state having signed the ICCPR and the OP-1, 
would be in violation of its undertaking if it had jurisdiction over 
the parties and did not find in favor of the plaintiff in the circum- 
stances of the case. 
ere the Panel concludes that a national court, of a state 
having signed the ICCPR and the OP-1, would be in violation of 
its undertaking if it had jurisdiction over the parties and did not 
find in favor of the plaintiff in the circumstances of the case, it is 
to decide in favor of the plaintiff and decide on an appropriate 
division of costs. 
the Panel concludes that a national court, sf a state 
d the HCCPR and the OP-1, would not be in violation 
of its undertaking if it had jurisdiction over the parties and did not 
find in favor of the plaintiff in the circumstances of the case, it is 
ecide in favor of the efendant and decide on an a 
division of costs. 
Article 8 is the second key provision of the Convention Model. 
is aimed at establishing a mini urn standard of protection both in 
relation to the right of reputation and in relation to freedom of 
speech. In doing so, it draws u on the balance between these fun- 
amental human rights struck in the ICC 
ticle 8, the Panel will only ever fin in. the plaintiff's 
favor where not doing so would mean that the JI~I-KKLIII standard 
of protection for the right of reputation would be violated. In 
other words, as far as mass-communicated material on the 
nternet is concerned, the balance struck between the right of rep- 
utation and freedom of speech would be as favora le to the free- 
dom of speech as is allowable under the HCC 
This Convention shall enter into force when s 
red ratified, by at least two states, both o hick.1 meet the 
ia set out in Article 3. 
tick 9 simply outlines when the proposed Convention Model 
is to come into force. There appears to be no reason why the Con- 
vention would not enter into force if at least two states want it to 
The Panel shall report its judgments. In particul 
s shall be made available, free of charge, on th  
In order to  establish an appropriate balance between freedom of 
speech and the right of reputation, it is important that the Panel's 
cisions are rn public. As is demonstrated, for example, 
gal Information Institute successfull mod 
rge, publication of legal materials can 
found. 
This article has illustrated how borders currently are being 
placed on the Internet through a combination of jurisdictional 
claims and technical developments. It has also made clear that 
these borders are likely to transform the Internet from an open 
and virtually global communications network, into something that 
more resembles our physical world divided by borders of different 
kinds. 
It has been submitted that in light of the threat of such an unde- 
lopment, we must re-examine the possibility of treat- 
rnet as a separate space. Suc a space must be 
a context-specific manner. In o er words? we 
eal with each legal issue separately. Furt ore, if states ever 
are to  be inclined to  give up their claims to regulating the 
Internet, alternative forms of regulation must be put in place; 
relying on self-re lation is not an option today. In addition, an 
must be put in place and effective enforce- 
is concerned, a well-recognized regulatory 
framework is already in place through the ICCPR, and an adjudi- 
rawing upon these existing 
del to  regulate cross-border 
unication was 
